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Abstract
Previous research has shown that overconfidence is associated with a decrease in
the quality of decision making and, therefore, decision outcomes. However, less is
known about the conditions or circumstances that reduce financial overconfidence.
Using data from two national studies, this study was designed to provide insights
into the dynamics of intrahousehold financial decision making by examining the
role of shared decision making in reducing overconfidence bias. Findings suggest
that a psychological sense of shared ownership of money is associated with lower
levels of overconfidence. With regard to financial planning practice, these results
suggest that married individuals who believe in shared ownership of household
money tend to have lower levels of overconfidence.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
While every adult faces day-to-day challenges when making
financial decisions, the variety and complexity of financial
decisions faced by married adults is often more complicated.
The effectiveness of decision making at the couple level can
mean the difference between achieving or not achieving
important household financial goals for each household
member (Lynch Jr., 2011). Obtaining a better understanding
of the dynamics associated with financial decision making
among couples has important policy and financial planning
implications. According to the Current Population Survey
(2018), roughly 50% of U.S. households are married with
more than 60% of the population residing in married house-
holds. Members of married households can include children,
parents, grandparents, and others (Davis, 1976). However,
regardless of household makeup, the financial resources and
decision making in these households tend to be concentrated
in the hands of the husband and/or wife. Even though this
insight is well known, little attention has been paid to the
impacts of marriage on financial decision making. Nearly all
existing studies examine marital status as if marriage was a
relatively fixed state rather than a relationship built on
dynamic interactions. Understanding how marriage can
influence financial decisions requires a deeper understanding
of the decision making process that is negotiated
(or acquiesced to) by the parties involved (Ashby & Bur-
goyne, 2009; Bernasek & Bajtelsmit, 2002). The nature of
the decision making process cannot be captured by a marital
status datapoint or as a snapshot of the resources (e.g., bank
accounts) a household possesses.
Overconfidence is a personal characteristic that may pro-
vide profound insights into the manner in which financial
decision making is undertaken among those who are mar-
ried. As such, overconfidence may represent a key factor
that influences the quality of financial outcomes. In the con-
text of household financial decision making, overconfidence
can be conceptualized as a person's level of overestimation
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of her or his capacity to make financial decisions. In the lit-
erature, overconfidence has been associated with poor finan-
cial decision making that results in financial outcomes that
are worse than decisions made using a more calibrated confi-
dence level (Barber & Odean, 2001; Bhandari & Deaves,
2006; Gervais & Odean, 2001; Glaser & Weber, 2007;
Moulton, Loibl, Samak, & Collins, 2013; Robb, Babiarz,
Woodyard, & Seay, 2015). Overconfident decision makers
are more likely to take risks (Hadar, Sood, & Fox, 2013) and
delay information search behavior (Lee & Hogarth, 2000).
In fact, those who exhibit overconfidence are less likely to
engage in the help-seeking search process, even though the
information obtained might reduce uncertainty and improve
decision outcomes. In addition, those who exhibit over-
confidence are more likely to rely on inflated estimates of
decision making capabilities even when the objective facts
of the situation, and other evidence, fail to support the per-
son's perceptions (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000). Although the
popular marital press is replete with examples, there has
been very little research conducted to test the effects of mar-
riage on overconfident behavior.1
In this paper, we argue that a marriage in which financial
decision making is shared may provide the conditions neces-
sary for more effective decision making feedback. Two rea-
sons underlie this possibility. First, the presence of an
observer, who is in a position to see gaps between confi-
dence and ability, may reduce some or all bias resulting from
overconfidence. Second, the willingness and ability of the
observer to provide effective feedback to the overconfident
individual may help shift problematic decision making
(Arkes, Christensen, Lai, & Blumer, 1987; Lichtenstein and
Fischhoff, 1977; Mahajan, 1992). The result is that married
individuals who share financial decision making should be
more calibrated in their financial knowledge (i.e., have lower
levels of overconfidence) than married individuals who do
not share financial decision making. The existing literature
provides general support for this notion. A gap in the litera-
ture, however, relates to what constitutes sharing and
whether the conceptualization and operationalization of shar-
ing matters. The extant literature has considered at least four
ways sharing can be measured among married couples:
(a) the presence of a joint account as evidence of pooling
(Pahl, 1989); (b) shared power in the form of both spouses
having final say in important financial decisions (Blood &
Wolfe, 1960); (c) perceived ownership of money in which a
spouse perceives that money in the household is shared
(Ashby & Burgoyne, 2009); and (d) a sense of being
included in financial decision making (Bernasek &
Bajtelsmit, 2002).
The purpose of this paper is to describe two tests related
to overconfidence and financial decision making among
married couples. First, using data from the 2015 FINRA
Investor Survey, we examine the relationship between
shared decision making within the marriage and over-
confidence in financial knowledge. Second, using data from
an online survey of a national sample of 320 married indi-
viduals collected in December of 2018, we explore whether
the form of shared decision making is associated with over-
confidence. Across the two studies, we employ different
methodological approaches to describe and assess a person's
financial knowledge overconfidence and two different
populations of study.
2 | REVIEW OF LITERATURE
2.1 | The relationship between shared decision
making and overconfidence
Previous literature on the topic of overconfidence provides
evidence that providing humbling and immediate feedback
(i.e., feedback that demonstrates the limits of what one
knows in the moment) can be used to help reduce over-
confidence (Arkes et al., 1987; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff,
1977; Mahajan, 1992). The presence of another person
observing the decision making process can help reduce
knowledge overconfidence and improve decision making
ability. This occurs primarily through direct and indirect
feedback from the outside observer to the decision maker
(Harvey & Fischer, 1997). In effect, the outside observer can
help a decision maker recognize the boundaries of the deci-
sion maker's capacities, which often leads to an increase in
the likelihood of seeking advice, support, and guidance
(Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, & Neale, 1996; Wittenbaum
& Stasser, 1996).
The presence of another person during financial decision
making (i.e., shared decision making) may establish the con-
ditions necessary for the type of feedback that mitigates
overconfidence (Arkes et al., 1987; Gruenfeld et al., 1996;
Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Kennedy, Anderson, & Moore,
2013; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; Mahajan, 1992;
Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996). When spouses share decision
making responsibilities, each spouse is more likely to com-
municate and interact regarding perceptions and preferences
related to the financial situation. This interaction enables
each member of the couple to profit from the knowledge and
skills of the other (Flury & Ickes, 2006). In addition, trust
has been shown to be an important element in the willing-
ness to consider feedback (Addo, 2017; Addo & Sassler,
2010). Shared decision making is more likely to occur when
trust, commitment, and some degree of loyalty are present in
the relationship (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985).
The condition of shared decision making may influence
overconfidence by adjusting the “personal fable” playing in
the mind of the overconfident investor that creates a “sense
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of invulnerability” (Grable, McGill, & Britt, 2009, p. 4).
When making financial decisions alone, it is easier to spin a
tale around one's own perceived knowledge and ability.
Without an intimate partner observing the details and out-
comes of decisions closely, the decision maker is more
likely to enhance her or his status, regardless of anticipated
or real outcomes (Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Ken-
nedy, 2012).
Based on a review of the extant literature, it is reasonable
to argue that a marriage in which financial decision making
is shared will be associated with lower levels of exhibited
overconfidence. Married individuals who share financial
decision making tasks with their spouse are likely to have
greater opportunity for feedback, which has been shown to
decrease overconfidence. Thus, the first hypothesis tested in
this study is: There will be an inverse relationship between
the presence of shared financial decision making and
overconfidence.
2.2 | Shared decision making within the
marriage
The second research question tested in this study has to do
with whether the nature of shared financial decision making
matters as a mechanism to improving outcomes. The concept
of financial sharing within marriage has been examined in at
least four different ways. These four approaches can be
grouped into two general types. First, the structural approach
that examines how a married couple organizes and uses
money. This approach includes Pahl's (1989) concept of
pooling money in a joint account and the concept of shared
power used by Blood and Wolfe (1960). With these
approaches, access to money is an important concept in
defining sharing. With pooling, each spouse has “access to
all or nearly all household money and both are thought to be
responsible for management and expenditure from the com-
mon pool” (Vogler & Pahl, 1994, p. 269). With the
resource-based view of power, shared power indicates that a
majority of a household's financial decisions are made by
both spouses equally (Blood & Wolfe, 1960). In a compari-
son of these two conceptualizations, Vogler and Pahl (1994)
found that couples with joint accounts tend to exhibit equal
control over important household financial decisions. Shared
activities, however, tend to be more closely aligned with the
structure of the relationship (Kim & Waite, 2014). Shared
activities indicate little about attitudes and emotions regard-
ing the ownership and use of household financial resources.
The second type of shared financial decision making is
sometimes referred to as the psychological approach. The
psychological approach includes perceived ownership of
money (Ashby & Burgoyne, 2008, 2009) and a sense
of inclusion (Bernasek and Bajtelsmit, 2002). Perceived
ownership of money can range from feeling that joint and
individual money within the household can be distinguished
(i.e., distinct ownership) to feeling that all money within the
household, regardless of source, is shared (i.e., shared own-
ership) (Ashby & Burgoyne, 2009). A sense of ownership is
psychological, meaning that ownership “manifests itself in
the meaning and emotion” of the individual (Pierce,
Kostova, & Dirks, 2003, p. 86). Ashby and Burgoyne
(2009) found that perceived ownership of money can exist
across several structural arrangements within the household.
Measuring feelings of inclusion in household financial
decisions is another psychological approach that can be used
to examine shared financial decision making (Kim & Waite,
2014). In contrast to the other approaches described thus far,
inclusion has been studied somewhat peripherally as a
desired, rather than measured, condition. Inclusion has been
used primarily as a general research question regarding
which spouse is involved in specific decisions (Bernasek &
Bajtelsmit, 2002; Davis, 1976). Feeling included, however,
has important psychological implications (e.g., well-being,
physical and mental health, etc.) that have been studied
largely outside the domain of financial decision making
(Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995).
We argue in this study that the psychological approaches
related to perceived ownership of money and inclusion will
have a stronger association with overconfidence than the
structural approaches of pooling money in joint accounts
and sharing in financial decisions. As demonstrated by
Ashby and Burgoyne (2009), having money in a joint
account is not synonymous with a belief that ownership of
the money is shared. The psychological sense of shared
decision making is more closely aligned with the conditions
required for feedback that have been shown to reduce over-
confidence. Inclusion suggests the opportunity for an inter-
action to occur, although the paucity of research on
inclusion does not suggest how this opportunity will or
could impact overconfidence. The extant research on per-
ceived shared ownership of money suggests the opportunity
and motivation to provide feedback. Thus, the second
hypothesis tested in this study is: Perceived ownership of
money will be more strongly and inversely related to over-
confidence than having joint accounts or sharing in the final
say in financial decisions. We make no formal hypothesis
regarding inclusion given the lack of direction from the
extant literature.
3 | METHODOLOGY
The first hypothesis regarding the relationship between
shared decision making and overconfidence was tested using
a sample of married investors and a summary indicator of
subjective financial knowledge in the measurement of
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overconfidence. A national sample of married adults, and
indicators of confidence in a series of financial knowledge
questions, was used to test the second hypothesis regarding
the nature of shared decision making.
3.1 | Sample and data
Two datasets were used to examine the hypotheses. The first
dataset was the 2015 National Financial Capability Survey
(NFCS) Investor Survey. This survey, administered by
FINRA, was used to examine the first hypothesis regarding a
relationship between shared financial decision making and
overconfidence. The data file is publicly available (FINRA,
2015). Respondents in the 2015 NFCS State-by-State Survey
who indicated they had investments, other than retirement
accounts, were asked to complete questions about investment
broker and financial advisor relationships, understanding of
fees charged, usage of investment information sources, atti-
tudes toward investing, and investor literacy. The full Inves-
tor Survey dataset includes 2,000 respondents. This study
was delimited to focus on the 1,371 married individuals in
the sample. The final sample was comprised of 55.5% male,
82.3% White, and 63.5% college-educated respondents.
A majority of respondents (53.5%) were age 55 or older,
whereas 42.5% had incomes of $100,000 or more.
The second dataset, an online survey with a national sam-
ple of 320 married individuals ages 18 and older, was based
on the Survey Sampling International panel. Data were used
to examine the second hypothesis regarding the relationship
between the nature of shared decision making and over-
confidence. This survey was conducted in December of
2018. The sample was comprised of 52.5% female, 64.1%
White non-Hispanic, 12.2% Hispanic, and 12.8% Black non-
Hispanic respondents. The average income of respondents
was $86,711. The mean age of respondents was 48.2 years.
The National Financial Capability Survey of the Finan-
cial Industry Regulatory Authority is secondary data. The
second dataset is an online survey conducted with approval
from the Institutional Review Board at the University of
Georgia.
3.2 | Measures
3.2.1 | Measures for hypothesis 1
Overconfidence
A subjective probability paradigm was used to measure over-
confidence. In the context of this paradigm, overconfidence
exists when confidence in one's financial knowledge is
greater than one's actual financial knowledge; thus, two mea-
sures are required: confidence and accuracy (see de Zwaan,
Lee, Liu, & Chardon, 2017, for a recent example).
According to Moore and Healy (2008), an overconfidence
indicator can qualify as a measure of a person's over-
estimation knowledge and as a measure of disproportionate
confidence in the precision of one's domain-specific knowl-
edge (i.e., over-precision).2
Confidence was measured using the following question
from the NFCS Investor Survey: “On a scale from 1 to
7, where 1 means very low and 7 means very high, how
would you assess your overall knowledge about investing?”
Accuracy was assessed using a 10-item investment knowl-
edge battery. Items in the scale are shown in Table 1. There
were 19 cases in which all 10 items were given “don’t
know” responses. Following a procedure advocated by Knoll
and Houts (2012), “don’t know” and “prefer not to say”
responses were assumed to be instances in which the individ-
ual was unwilling or unable to provide the correct response.
Objective knowledge was coded as 0.7 for correct responses
to each of the 10 items. This calculation approach produces a
score of 7 if the respondent answered all 10 items correctly.3
Overconfidence was calculated as the difference between
a respondent's subjective assessment of her or his knowledge
and the person's summed score on the 10-item quiz. Positive
values suggest overconfidence whereas negative values indi-
cate underconfidence (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein,
1977; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; Robb et al., 2015).
The resulting values ranged from −5.0 to 7.0 with a mean of
1.57 and a SD of 1.78.
Shared decision making
Shared decision making was measured by examining how
investment decisions were made within the household. The
binary variable was measured with a single item assessing
whether the respondent was the primary financial decision
maker when making investments choices or shared the
responsibility with someone else in the household.
Intrahousehold shared decision making was coded as “1” if
the respondent shared responsibility and “0” if they did not.
In the sample, 44.9% of respondents shared financial
decision making with someone in their household. Descrip-
tive statistics for the dependent and independent variables
used in Hypothesis 1 are shown in Table 2.
3.2.2 | Measures for hypothesis 2
Overconfidence
The financial knowledge scale developed by Fernandes,
Lynch Jr., and Netemeyer (2014) was used to assess each
respondent's knowledge. Knowledge scores were based on
the percent of questions answered correctly. Our use of the
knowledge scale was unique in that following each answer, a
respondent was asked to indicate her or his confidence in the
answer using a 0 to 100-point slider anchored with “Not
Confident at All” (0 points) and “Completely Confident”
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TABLE 1 Objective investor knowledge items (FINRA investor survey)
Investor knowledge item Response options Percent answering correctly
G4. If you buy a company's stock... You own a part of the company;
You have lent money to the company;
You are liable for the company's debts;
The company will return your original
investment to you;
Do not know;
Prefer not to say
76.6
G5. If you buy a company's bond... You own a part of the company;
You have lent money to the company;
You are liable for the company's debts;
You can vote on shareholder resolutions;
Do not know;
Prefer not to say
70.4
G6. If a company files for bankruptcy, which of
the following securities is most at risk of
becoming virtually worthless?
The company's preferred stock;
The company's common stock;
The company's bonds;
Do not know;
Prefer not to say
55.2
G7. In general, investments that are riskier tend to
provide higher returns over time than
investments with less risk.
True;
False;
Do not know;
Prefer not to say
76.4
G8. Over the last 20 years in the U.S., the best
average returns have been generated by:
Stocks;
Bonds;
CDs;
Money market accounts;
Precious metals;
Do not know;
Prefer not to say
61.2
G9. What has been the approximate average
annual return of the S&P 500 stock index over
the past 20 years (not adjusted for inflation)?
−10%;
−5%;
5%;
10%;
15%;
20%;
Do not know;
Prefer not to say
27.9
G10. Which of the following best explains the
distinction between nominal returns and real
returns?
Nominal returns are pre-tax returns/real returns are
after-tax returns;
Nominal returns are what an investment is expected to
earn/real returns are what an investment actually
earns;
Nominal returns are not adjusted for inflation/real
returns are adjusted for inflation;
Nominal returns are not adjusted for fees and
expenses/real returns are adjusted for fees and
expenses;
Do not know;
Prefer not to say
11.3
G11. Which of the following best explains why
many municipal bonds pay lower yields than
other government bonds?
Municipal bonds are lower risk;
There is a greater demand for municipal bonds;
Municipal bonds can be tax-free;
Do not know;
Prefer not to say
38.8
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(100 points). An average confidence score was used to indi-
cate each respondent's confidence level. Overconfidence was
calculated as the ratio difference between average confidence
in financial knowledge and actual knowledge (see Kim &
Waite, 2014). A negative score indicated some degree of
underconfidence, whereas a positive score indicated a degree
of overconfidence. Average confidence was measured to be
79% (SD = 20.05%; Mdn = 84.58%), with scores ranging
from 3.08 to 100.0%. This stands in contrast to a mean per-
centage of correct answers of 65.78% (SD = 22.99%;
Mdn = 61.54%), with scores ranging from 15.38 to 100.0%.
The result was an average overconfidence of 19.11% (SD =
22.47%; Mdn = 14.58%), with scores ranging from
−37.62% (i.e., maximal underconfidence) to 76.38%.
Shared decision making
Shared decision making was measured in four ways: (a) the
presence of a joint account; (b) shared power or final say;
(c) perceived shared ownership of money; and (d) a sense of
inclusion. The presence of a joint account (i.e., checking or
savings) was measured by asking each respondent whether
she or he had such an account. Each partner responded sepa-
rately for the presence of a joint checking and savings
account. If either of these conditions were true, the binary
joint account variable was set to 1, otherwise 0. Of the
respondents, 69% reported having a joint checking account
and 55% reported a joint savings account.
Shared power was measured by asking each respondent
to indicate whether a set of financial decisions was made by
the respondent, her or his spouse, or both equally. The finan-
cial decisions included a spending plan or budget for the
household, charitable giving decisions (such as donations,
tithing, etc.), large purchases (such as furniture, house, or
cars), investment decisions (such as life insurance, stocks, or
mutual funds), how any extra money will be used, and how
an unexpected expense would be handled. Shared power
was indicated by the percent of the decisions in which final
say was shared equally with a spouse. The average was
50.5% with a SD of 0.42.
Perceived ownership of money was measured using a
scale developed by Ashby and Burgoyne (2009). Items in
this scale can be used to assess shared and distinct percep-
tions of money ownership among spouse in a marriage.
Items assessing shared ownership included: (a) It does not
matter how much we each pay toward joint expenses as long
as they all get paid; (b) It makes no difference which
account or name money is kept in—all the money belongs to
both of us; and (c) I would say my partner and I usually just
give rather than loan each other money. Items assessing dis-
tinct ownership included: (a) If I borrowed money from my
spouse, I would always pay them back and I would expect
them to do the same; (b) Contributing equally to household
expenses and splitting costs 50/50 is very important to me;
and (c) We see ourselves as separate from each other finan-
cially. Responses were provided on a 5-point scale of
strongly agree to strongly disagree. Shared ownership for
the household was indicated by the ratio of shared to distinct
ownership. The average ratio was 1.56 with a SD of 0.93.
Inclusion in financial decision making was measured by
asking each respondent the extent to which the respondent
believed she or he was included in each of the shared power
TABLE 1 (Continued)
Investor knowledge item Response options Percent answering correctly
G12. You invest $500 to buy $1,000 worth of
stock on margin. The value of the stock drops
by 50%. You sell it. Approximately how much
of your original $500 investment are you left
with in the end?
$500;
$250;
$0;
Do not know;
Prefer not to say
26.8
G13. Which is the best definition of “selling
short”?
Selling shares of a stock shortly after buying it;
Selling shares of a stock before it has reached its peak;
Selling shares of a stock at a loss;
Selling borrowed shares of a stock;
Do not know;
Prefer not to say
26.8
TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent
variables (Hypothesis 1)
Mean SD
Overconfidence 1.57 1.78
Subjective knowledge 4.90 1.37
Objective knowledge 3.31 1.55
Intrahousehold financial decision making Incidence
I am the primary decision maker when it
comes to making investment decisions
for my household.
55.1%
I share the decision making responsibility
when it comes to investments for my
household.
44.9%
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financial decisions listed above. Inclusion in each financial
decision was indicated by a 0- to 100-point slider anchored
by “Not included at all” (0 points) and “Completely
included” (100 points). Sense of inclusion was estimated by
the response average. The average inclusion score was 74.4
with a SD of 25.3.
Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent
variables are shown in Table 3.
3.2.3 | Control variables
A set of demographic and socioeconomic factors were
included as controls. For Hypothesis 1, these controls were
(a) sex, (b) age (18–34, 35–54, or 55 or older), (c) income
(less than $50,000, $50,000 to less than $100,000, $100,000
or more), (d) race/ethnicity (White vs., non-White), and
(e) educational attainment (less than a college degree vs.,
college or postgraduate degree). Dummy variables were con-
structed for each of these control variables. “Age 18–34”
was the comparison category for age and “$100,000 or
more” was the comparison category for income. Descriptive
statistics for the Hypothesis 1 control variables are shown in
Table 4.
The same demographic and socioeconomic factors were
included in the assessment of Hypothesis 2 although at finer
levels of detail: age was available in years, race/ethnicity
included categories beyond White, nine categories of income
were available ranging from less than $15,000 to more than
$150,000, and a full range of educational attainment options
was available. Descriptive data for the Hypothesis 2 control
variables is shown in Table 5.
3.3 | Analytical strategy
Tests of the hypotheses involved the estimation of a single
model. The difference between models was the measure of
shared decision making. The model can be formally
expressed as:
Overconfidencei = β0 + β1 shared decisioni + β2 malei
+ β3 whitei + β4 college ormorei
+ β5 age 35 to 54i + β6 age 55 plusi
+ β7 income 50K to 100Ki
+ β8 income 100Kplusi + ϵi
All models relied on full information maximum likeli-
hood (FIML) estimators with heteroskedastic-robust stan-
dard errors following Eicker (1967), Huber (1967), and
White (1980). FIML incorporates all available information
in order to address missing data that arise, for example, due
to nonsubstantive responses (i.e., “don’t know” or “prefer
not to say”). The validity of this approach follows the formal
argument that the marginal probability distribution of the
complete (i.e., nonmissing) observations yields the true like-
lihood for the parameter of interest (Schafer & Graham,
2002, p. 162 et seq.). The method formally requires that data
are not systematically missing.
A large set of logistic regressions, using binary indicators
for missing observations, was fitted as a pre-analysis to test
for the presence of data that were missing completely at ran-
dom (Howell, 2008). The findings suggested that complete
randomness across all variables was unsupported by the
data. Consequently, missingness at random was assumed.
Reports from all regressions include unstandardized and
standardized coefficients, given that the underlying datasets
provide sufficient statistical power to provide reliable and
comparable standardized results under the central limit theo-
rem (Wooldridge, 2002). The following sections summarize
the findings from this regression under FIML.
4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Findings regarding the relationship
between shared decision making and
overconfidence
Table 6 reports the results from the regression of over-
confidence on shared decision making (Hypothesis 1). When
controlling for sex, age, income, education, and race, results
show that, compared to the condition of no sharing, sharing
investment decision making within the household was asso-
ciated with lower levels of overconfidence. This finding sup-
ports the first hypothesis. In addition, the standardized
results indicated that the negative association between
shared decision making and overconfidence was comparable
to the coefficients of gender and ethnicity among married
couples. The diminishing affiliations of age and education
were in alignment with previous research (e.g., Hansson,
TABLE 3 Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent
variables (Hypothesis 2)
Variable Mean SD
Overconfidence 19.11 22.47
Average confidence 79.00 20.05
Percent of answers correct 65.78 22.99
Intrahousehold decision making
Presence of joint checking or savings account 80.0%
Shared power 50.5 41.7
Perceived ownership of money
(shared/separate)
1.56 0.93
Inclusion in household financial decisions 74.4 25.3
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Rönnlund, Juslin, & Nilsson, 2008; Piehlmaier, 2014). Con-
trary to studies on the role of gender as a variable associated
with financial decision making (e.g., Barber & Odean,
2001), married males were found to exhibit lower levels of
overconfidence. The coefficients for income and ethnicity
followed a decreasing pattern. Finally, the amount of
explained variance in the model (R2) was approximately
14%, which was deemed appropriately large and meaningful
given the nature of the model.
A robustness check, using a second sufficiently indepen-
dent measure that relied on financial (instead of investment)
knowledge questions, is reported in Supporting Information,
Tables S1-S5. The finding that shared decision making was
associated with reduced levels of overconfidence in financial
knowledge added evidence to the robustness of the original
model, given parametric changes, as indicated by virtually
identical standardized coefficients for the binary shared
decision making indicators across the two overconfidence
measures.
4.2 | Findings regarding the type of shared
decision making
Table 7 presents the unstandardized coefficients, using
FIML and heteroskedastic-robust SEs, for type of shared
decision making. The coefficients are based on regressing
financial knowledge overconfidence on shared decision
making using the four measures identified above, and a set
of control variables (namely, gender, age, education,
TABLE 4 Control variable characteristics (Hypothesis 1)
Variable Incidence (%)
Sex
Male 55.5
Female 44.5
Race
White 82.3
Non-White 17.7
Age
18–34 13.5
35–54 33.0
55 or older 53.5
Income
Less than $50,000 11.4
$50,000 to less than $100,000 46.2
$100,000 or more 42.5
Educational attainment
Less than a college degree 36.5
College or postgraduate degree 63.5
TABLE 5 Control variable characteristics (Hypothesis 2)
Control variables Mean/incidence SD
Female in % 52.5
Age (in years) 48.2 16.3
Education (in %)
High school graduate 16.3
Some college 18.1
Associates' degree 9.7
Bachelor's degree 25.9
Master's degree 22.2
PhD, MD, JD 7.8
Income (in %)
Less than $15,000 4.1
$15,000 to less than $25,000 3.8
$25,000 to less than $35,000 5.9
$35,000 to less than $50,000 10.9
$50,000 to less than $75,000 20.0
$75,000 to less than $100,000 21.3
$100,000 to less than $150,000 18.1
$150,000 or more 11.9
Prefer not to say 4.1
Race/ethnicity (in %)
White, non-Hispanic 64.1
Black, non-Hispanic 12.8
Hispanic 12.2
Asian, non-Hispanic 3.1
TABLE 6 Regression results for shared decision making
Dependent variable:
NFCS
unstandardized
NFCS
standardized
Overconfidence (1) (2)
Shared decision −0.253* (0.1000) −0.071*
Female 0.300** (0.0998) 0.084**
White −0.445*** (0.126) −0.095***
College or more −0.517*** (0.0972) −0.140***
Age 35–54 −0.629*** (0.161) −0.166***
Age 55+ −1.347*** (0.148) −0.376***
Income $50,000–
$99,999
0.000747 (0.157) 0.000
Income $100,000+ −0.337* (0.161) −0.093*
Constant 3.328*** (0.222) 1.865***
Observations 1,371 1,371
R2 0.140
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
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income, and ethnicity/race), following the equation shown in
Section 2.3. A separate model was estimated for each mea-
sure of shared decision making.
First, results from the two psychological measures of
shared decision making (i.e., perceived ownership of money
and inclusion) were evaluated. In a first step, the association
between perceived ownership of money and overconfidence
was assessed. The first column in Table 5 lists the
unstandardized coefficients using FIML and heteroskedastic-
robust SEs to regress overconfidence in financial knowledge
on the perceived shared- to sole-ownership-of-money ratio
and the set of aforementioned control variables. It can be
observed in the model results that perceived shared owner-
ship was negatively associated with overconfidence,
mirroring the findings from the assessment of first hypothe-
sis. The standardized coefficients in the second column
showed that the effect size of perceived ownership of money
was exceeded only by income and age. The associations
between the control variables and overconfidence was some-
what different than the model used to test the first hypothe-
sis. Being male, highly educated, and White/non-Hispanic
were not significantly related to lower levels of over-
confidence. The model's R2 of 0.38 provided evidence of
excellent model fit.
The second model examining a psychological measure of
shared decision making analyzed the association between
financial knowledge overconfidence and perceived financial
inclusion within a marriage. The third column in Table 5
shows that a feeling of financial inclusion was statistically
significantly associated with elevated levels of financial
overconfidence. Only age and income were more important
that inclusion in the model. While the coefficients for age
and income continued to be notably negative, self-
identifying as Black/non-Hispanic was positively associated
with higher levels of overconfidence. The model's R2 of 0.42
suggested an excellent fit for this model.
Two other models were used to examine the structural
measures of shared decision making (i.e., shared financial
decision making power and pooling money in a joint
account). The fifth column in Table 5 reports the results for
shared power. Shared power in financial decision making
was not significantly associated with a decrease in over-
confidence. The remaining implications from the previous
regression regarding the roles of the control variables
remained the same. The R2 of this model was 0.37.
Lastly, a binary indicator for holding a joint account was
constructed and used as the primary independent variable
within the FIML regression. Maintaining such an account
did not have a traceable affiliation with the bias. A possible
reason for the absence of an effect can be found in the fact
that 80% of the sample had such an account. An excessively
large set of observations from married participants with and
without joint accounts would be needed to reduce the stan-
dard deviation to a level in which a reliable assessment
regarding this variable's role can be made. Finally, the
model's R2 was 0.39.
5 | DISCUSSION
This study demonstrates that shared decision making within
a marriage has the potential to reduce overconfidence when
making financial decisions. This possibility is most likely
when a married individual has a psychological sense of shar-
ing regarding ownership and use of household financial
resources, which is evidenced by perceived shared owner-
ship of money. Interestingly, a sense of inclusion in house-
hold financial decision making is associated with increased
overconfidence. These findings suggest that just being
involved in decision making is not enough to reduce
decision making bias associated with financial over-
confidence. Instead, the experience of navigating a shared
path with a spousal partner may be required to achieve such
an impact.
Structural assessments of shared decision making
(i.e., sharing power or final say and having a joint account)
were not found to have a significant association with over-
confidence in financial knowledge. This finding extends the
work of Ashby and Burgoyne (2009) regarding the indepen-
dent nature of types of sharing by comparing association
with overconfidence. In addition, the results provide impor-
tant insights into the nature of intrahousehold decision
making by describing the effect of shared decision making
structure and psychology on the extent of overconfidence, a
bias that is known to produce largely negative effects on
financial outcomes (Barber & Odean, 2001; Bhandari &
Deaves, 2006; Gervais & Odean, 2001; Glaser & Weber,
2007; Moulton et al., 2013; Robb et al., 2015).
5.1 | Study limitations
A key limitation associated with this study is the issue of
endogeneity. With cross-sectional data and the lack of a rea-
sonable and available instrumental variable, it is not possible
to rule out the possibility that overconfidence influences the
probability of sharing financial decision making. In fact, the
true relationship may be nonrecursive with shared decision
making influencing overconfidence and overconfidence
influencing shared decision making. Future research should
be devoted to exploring this possibility. The current study,
therefore, should be considered an initial assessment in help-
ing to describe the possible role of shared decision making in
decreasing overconfidence. The current study is intended to
prompt a discussion between and among financial planning
practitioners, their clients, and the research community on this
WARMATH ET AL. 11 of 14
important topic. Additional research (i.e., longitudinal research
and/or experiments) is required to examine the causality of the
relationships observed.
5.2 | Implications for financial practitioners
This study offers several implications for those in the finan-
cial planning community who have an interest in financial
decision making and planning dynamics among those who
are married. The extant literature has tended to examine the
financial decision making outcomes associated with over-
confidence rather than the conditions that lessen the impact
of overconfidence on financial decisions. As a result, it is
well known that overconfidence tends to lead to suboptimal
outcomes. On the other hand, little about how to address the
issues of overconfidence are described in the literature. This
paper shifts the focus to the conditions that advance the con-
versation toward an understanding of the social psychology
of overconfidence for married individuals. This, and addi-
tional, work contributes to the development of interventions
to lessen overconfidence.
This study has direct implications for the practice of
financial planning as well. In 2015, roughly 40% of Ameri-
cans consulted a professional financial planner (Certified
Financial Planner Board of Standards, 2015). Although there
are numerous reasons why clients might turn to a profes-
sional advisor (e.g., to answer certain financial questions or
construct a financial plan), not all advisor-client relation-
ships lead to the successful development and execution of a
solid financial plan for a client. The model of shared
decision making within the household may offer insights for
establishing advisor-client relationships that encourage
greater pursuit financial plans that lead to better household
outcomes. By encouraging a sense of shared ownership
among clients, financial planners may also benefit from the
reduced overconfidence and concomitant increase in willing-
ness to consider feedback by encouraging greater sharing of
financial decision making with a spouse for their married
clients.
5.3 | Directions for future research
An important question remains unanswered: can the private
market provide a substitute for intrahousehold shared
decision making, perhaps in the form of a professional finan-
cial planner? Future research could examine this possibility.
There is evidence to suggest that this substitution may be
possible. In a professional context, sharing is essentially bor-
rowing competence from the professional advisor. Previous
research has indicated that the use of a financial planner can
improve consistency in household decision making with
regards to risk tolerance (Park & Yao, 2016). The decision
to share investment decision making with a financial planner
may operate as a form of insurance or self-protection
(Ehrlich & Becker, 1972). The expertise and presence of a
financial planner may provide a potential mirror reflecting
areas of overconfidence by questioning flawed logic or
beliefs. Studies have shown that co-production, trust, and
communication increase commitment and loyalty in client-
advisor relationships (Auh, Bell, McLeod, & Shih, 2007;
Christiansen & DeVaney, 1998). Sharing investment
decision making helps balance client expectations of future
outcomes and reduces the illusion of control (Langer, 1975).
It is also plausible, however, to also conclude that esta-
blishing a relationship with a paid advisor may be dependent
on lower levels of overconfidence as some recognition of
the need for help may precede the search for an external
advisor for such a defined need. In addition, the advisor-
client relationship may be more limited in its ability to pro-
vide humbling and effective feedback than the married cou-
ple relationship, since it lacks the bonds found in marriage
that make it more difficult to fire a spouse.
5.4 | Conclusion
Findings from this study suggest that a psychological sense
of shared ownership of money within the household is asso-
ciated with lower levels of overconfidence. Given the nega-
tive implications of overconfidence for financial outcomes
(Barber & Odean, 2001), helping couples develop this sense
of shared psychological ownership may lead to higher levels
of financial well-being.
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ENDNOTES
1Examples of popular press views on marriage include a February 2018
article by Cosmopolitan on the ways in which your relationship
changes after marriage (https://www.cosmopolitan.com/uk/love-sex/
a15954525/ways-your-relationship-changes-after-marriage/) and a
2013 Lifehacker article on what you wish you had known prior to
marriage (https://lifehacker.com/7-things-i-wish-i-had-known-before-
getting-married-1452066572).
2Over-placement, also called better-than-average effect (i.e., the ten-
dency to rate one's skills or performance to be superior relative to a
[sub]population average), was not considered in the current study.
3The results of an item response theory model assessing the difficulty
of the items, is available in Tables S1–S5.
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